Although loss and grief are ubiquitous human experiences, prolonged grief disorder (PGD) stands apart as a serious psychiatric condition. 1 , 2 Individuals with PGD are more likely to have worse quality of life, be impaired at work and in their social lives, suffer psychologically, and be suicidal. 1 , 2 Given the elevated prevalence of psychiatric symptoms in next of kin (NOK) during and after a patient's stay in the ICU, 3 , 4 we hypothesized that following the death of a loved one, NOK would be at particular risk of developing diagnosable PGD. We sought to determine the point prevalence rate of PGD in NOK during the 1-to 2-year period following the death of an adult with multiorgan failure who had been admitted to an ICU. In our prospective cohort study conducted at a tertiary referral hospital in Toledo, Spain, we assessed all NOK of patients who subsequently died in the ICU or on hospital wards or in the fi rst 6 months after discharge from the ICU. In order to include NOK of those dying in a nonhospital setting, patients were followed up for 6 months after discharge. We used the psychometrically validated consensus criteria for PGD. 1 , 5 , 6 A total of 151 NOK were assessed for an average of 22.1 (SD, 5.3) months after the patient's death. In 62.8% of cases, the NOK was the deceased's son or daughter, in 17% the partner/spouse, in 12.8% a sibling, and in 5.3% a parent; in 2.1% of cases another relative was contacted or a friend/neighbor was the NOK. Eleven NOK of patients who died in the ICU (10.3%) met the criteria for PGD ( Table 1 ) . NOK who met the criteria for PGD signifi cantly accessed psychiatric services more frequently (72.7%; P , .01) than did those who did not meet the criteria for PGD (8.3%). They were also signifi cantly more dissatisfi ed (57.1% vs 27.6%; P , .05) with the care received in the ICU. Following deaths among patients who had been admitted to an ICU in a Spanish hospital, PGD appears to occur in approximately 10% of NOK 1 to 2 years after death and is associated with accessing psy chiatric services and a greater dissatisfaction with ICU care.
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Sancho Rodríguez Villar , LMS Marcelino Sánchez Casado , LMS, PhD
Toledo, Spain Holly G. Prigerson , MD, PhD Boston, MA In a recent issue of CHEST (December 2011), Schwartzstein and Parker 1 describe an interesting and physiologically nuanced clinical case and attribute a resident's failure to solve it to cognitive biases. While we agree with the importance of cognitive biases in reasoning, we disagree with the attribution of the resident's errors to availability and anchoring. We propose an alternative framework for evaluating his errors, one which may be more instructive for avoiding them in the future.
The authors' attributions of cognitive biases in the case are based on an expository essay by Croskerry. 2 Croskerry's conceptions of cognitive biases deviate substantially from original descriptions, and he provides no empirical support for his altered formulations. 3 The availability heuristic, as originally described, is a rule of thumb by which the frequency of an event is judged by the ease with which the event comes to mind 4 ; usually, the frequency of a rare event is estimated to be higher than its actual frequency as when shark attacks are judged as more common than swimming pool drownings. Unless we are willing to attribute any poorly reasoned "fi rst-stab" provisional diagnosis to availability bias, it would not appear to have been operative in the presented case. Anchoring refers to mental fi xation on an irrelevant numerical anchor and the associated failure to suffi ciently adjust subsequent numerical estimates away from the anchor. 4 There are no numerical anchors in this case.
The resident's errors in judgment are more adequately explained in the context of the search-inference framework 5 , 6 which characterizes thinking as a search for goals, possibilities, and evidence conducted by cognitive system II. 7 (This is contrasted with a system I or rapid and intuitive assessment with little deliberate thinking. 7 ) With the goal of determining the cause of gas-exchange abnormalities in an ICU patient, the resident identifi ed a common potential cause (pulmonary embolism), but his search for other possibilities was inadequate. It is not that the resident "could not think of another explanation," 1 but rather that he made no apparent effort to do so. This error of inadequate search (or inadequate effort) can be avoided by active and deliberate formulation of a comprehensive differential diagnosis, especially in cases that are not straightforward, such as this one.
The failure to dismiss pulmonary embolism (and to expand the search for other possibilities) was compounded by an inadequate search for evidence, represented by failure to discover the distended abdomen and declining respiratory system compliance as well as neglect of other evidence that both militated against pulmonary embolism and pointed to the correct diagnosis. Confi rmation bias is present in this case but it is due to inadequate searching.
Anchoring and availability, depending on how you defi ne them and what evidence you require, may or may not have been operative in this case. Still, these cognitive biases do little to elucidate the resident's series of errors and omissions, and the admonition, "don't focus too much on what you think of fi rst," seems unlikely to avert similar error sequences in the future because it offers no guidance on what to focus on instead. The resident would be better advised to slow down (less system I and more system II) and to search more deliberately for goals, possibilities, and evidence. Indeed, it was such effortful searching that led the authors to the correct diagnosis in this case, the resident's unwavering enthusiasm for pulmonary embolism notwithstanding. 
